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RATIONALE OF PAST CONSIDERATION AND
MORAL CONSIDERATION*
C ONSIDERATION in Anglo-American law may involve three
fact situations: first, contemporaneous facts; second, subse-
quent facts; and third, antecedent facts. Where contemporaneous
facts are involved, the bargain theory of consideration, if any, is
adopted. Where subsequent facts are involved, the injurious and
justifiable reliance theory, if any, (or promissory estoppel) is
adopted. Where antecedent facts are involved, the theory of moral
consideration, if any, is adopted la
This article is concerned only with antecedent facts as consider-
ation. Antecedent facts for such purpose may be classified as:
(1) where there is a precedent debt still alive at the time the promise
is given; (2) where there was a precedent debt but it is no longer
alive at the time the promise is given; (3) where there were prior
pecuniary benefits but no precedent debt for which the promise is
given; (4) where there was past consideration but no pecuniary
benefits or precedent debt for which the promise is given; (5) where
the consideration, apparently past, was given at request; and
(6) where antecedent privileges and powers are given up, or waived,
by a promise. Each one of these antecedent fact situations will be
discussed in the order named.
*Where the precedent debt is still alive, the recovery is on such
precedent debt. There is no need of a new contract. Even though
a new promise is made, it adds nothing to the original liability.
It is true that some early cases in the seventeenth century held that
precedent debt was consideration for a new express promise to pay
* The Restatement of the American Law Institute, §85-89, covers only classes
one and two discussed herein. It simplifies the law by classifying these hinds
of promises I I as contracts without assent or consideration." This classification
gets a good result but it will have to be called simplification rather than
rationalization. The cases do not rationally support this simplification and
the Restatement itself gives no explanation. Of course it is apparent that
in this type of case, there has been no agreement, but the courts have been in
the habit of saying that there is moral consideration. Even though the Restate-
ment correctly simplifies the law, rationalization is also needed.
la Cf. comment to §366, Restatement of Law of Contracts. (Ed.)
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such debt, so that general assumpsit would lie on such promise.'
But Slade's Case2 held that wherever there was a precedent debt
the law would imply a promise to pay it, and that geheral assumpsit
would lie. This case shows that the making of an express promise
had no extra operative effect. The case of Rann v. Hughes' held
that a precedent debt would be consideration for no other promise
than the law would imply; that is, it would be consideration for no
promise to do any new and different thing from what a person was
already under legal obligation to do,4 and such existing or precedent
debt is not consideration for a promise of a third person to pay it.5
The effect of all of these cases was not to make precedent debt con-
sideration for a new promise, whether express or implied, but to
make the action of general assumpsit available where formerly debt
cnly had been available; that is, to make the action of general
assumpsit concurrent with debt on the old original debt. Both the
promise and the consideration were fictitious. The form was seized
upon to allow recovery in certain cases where it was desired not to
se the action of debt.' If precedent debt had really been the con-
sideration and if recovery in general assumpsit had really been upon
the new promise, express or implied, precedent debt should be held
to be sufficient consideration for promises to do other things than
to pay the precedent debt.
For this reason, this class of antecedent facts can be disregarded.
They do not create any new contract, because the old contract ade-
quately covers the ground of liability.
Suppose that the original precedent debt is one created by a
voidable contract, either because made by an infant or because pro-
cured by fraud, duress or undue influence. What should be the
rationalization? Is the person who has the power of avoidance
liable after he makes a new promise to pay in spite thereof, because
such new promise creates a new contract, or because of the original
'Edwards v. Burre, Dal. 104, pl. 45 (1573); Babington v. Lambert, Moore
K. B. 854 (1617) ; Janson v. Colomore, 1 Rolle 396 (1617) ; Hodge v. Vavisor,
1 Rolle 413 (1617); Howlet's Case, Latch 150 (1624); Barton v. Shirley, 1 Rolle's
Abr., 12, pl. 16 (1639).
2 4 Coke 92B (1602).
3 7 T. R. 350 (1778).
4 Young v. Ward, 33 Me. 359 (1851).
5 Ward v. Barrows, 86 Me. 147, 29 Atl. 922 (1893). But of. Hawkes v.
Saunders, Cowper 289 (1782).
6 McKelvey, Common Law Pleading, 26.
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contract I The better rationalization is that he is liable because of
the original contract. Some cases have held him liable on the new
promise. When they have done this, they have held the consider-
ation to be moral consideration of Class 2, presently to be con-
sidered.7 But the better explanation is that the party is liable on
his old original contract or promise. At the time of the making of
this promise or contract, the law, because of infancy, fraud, duress,
or undue influence, gave the party under legal incapacity or upon
whom fraud, physical restraint or moral constraint were practiced,
the privilege and the power of disaffirming such contract. This was
a power created by the law not because of the contract, but because
of these exterior circumstances. The contract itself still continued
to be a contract, although a voidable contract. By the exercise
of his power, the party having it could terminate the contract, of
course; but so long as he did not exercise his power, the contract
continued. By making a new promise, he gives us his power of
avoidance or "waives" the defense of infancy, fraud, duress, or
undue influence which the law gave to him. When he so gives up
his power of avoidance or "waives" his defense, he is liable on his
original contract, as he would have been if he had not pleaded such
defense; only now he has lost his power to plead such defense or
to avoid the contract.8
By this explanation, voidable contracts are assimilated to the
cases classified together in Class 1, above discussed. It is true a
new promise by the infant is required. A mere acknowledgment
is not sufficient, although it would seem that under this explanation
an acknowledgment ought to be enough. Probably the reason why
it is not is because of the desire to favor infants.9 Of course, if the
infant is discharged from liability by the running of the Statute
of Limitations or by a discharge in bankruptcy and he should
promise to pay his former debt or obligation, his liability would
have to be grounded on his new promise supported by moral con-
sideration, and in that case there would be another illustration of the
situation discussed under Class 2 below. Suppose the infant should
7 Merriam v. Wilkins, 6 N. H. 432 (1833); Edgerly v. Shaw, 25 N. H. 514
(1852).
s Hunt v. Massey, 5 B. & Ad. 902 (1834); Williams v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 256
(1843); West v. Penny, 16 Ala. 186 (1849); Hodges v. Hunt, 22 Barb. 150
(N. Y. 1856). See Class 6, infra. But of. §89 of the Restatement.
9 International Textbook Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722 (1912);
American Mortgage Co. v. Wright, 101 Ala. 658, 14 So. 399 (1894).
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disaffirm his voidable contract while a minor and after becoming
an adult should again promise to discharge his prior legal duty.
For example, suppose that an infant should buy an automobile and
promise to pay $3,000 for it, that the automobile is delivered to
him and he, in a state of intoxication, should completely ruin it
and should drop it into a river or quagmire where it cannot be
found, and that thereafter he disaffirms his obligation to pay the
$3,000, but after becoming of age, he changes his mind and promises
to pay the man who sold him the automobile the $3,000 which he
originally promised to pay. If he is to be held liable, it would have
to be upon this new promise, and the consideration for it, if any,
would be moral consideration where there once was a precedent
debt. Would the law hold him liable on this promise? It would
seem that it ought to hold him liable by analogy to the Statute of
Limitations and bankruptcy cases. The case is not like the case of
a gift to the promisor and a later promise by the promisor. This
also would then be another illustration of Class 2.
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act requires value to be
given as a condition of liability, but it defines value either as that
which is consideration for an informal contract or a pre-existing
or antecedent debt. The statement as to a pre-existing or antecedent
debt is ambiguous. It might refer to an antecedent debt which is
still alive or to one which is no longer alive or to both, but it is
authority for the proposition that an antecedent debt in some form
is recognized as consideration by the law of bills and notes.
2
Where there once was a precedent debt but it can not be sued on
because it is no longer alive at the time of the promise because dis-
charged by operation of law through the Statute of Limitations,"0
or a discharge in bankruptcy," or a discharge of a surety,' the
person making a promise to pay such precedent debt is liable on
this new promise because of the moral obligation still to pay such
10 Clark v. Jones, 233 Mass. 591, 124 N. E. 426 (1919); Barker v. Heath,
74 X. H. 270, 67 At. 222 (1907); Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174 (1879).
" Earle v. Oliver, 2 Ex. 71 (1848); Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625 (1913);
Herrington v. Davitt, 220 N. Y. 162, 115 N. E. 476 (1917); Willis v. Cushman,
115 Ind. 100, 17 N. E. 168 (1888).
12 Hurlburt v. Bradley, 94 Conn. 495, 109 Atl. 171 (1920); Rindge v. Kimball,
124 Mass. 209 (1878) ; Matehett v. Winona etc. Ass'n, 185 Ind. 128, 113 N. B.
1 (1916).
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precedent debt when it has been discharged by a rule of law. In
most of these cases the promisor has also received pecuniary benefits,
but apparently the receipt of pecuniary benefits is irrelevant because
promisors are liable in surety cases and some other cases though
they have not received any pecuniary benefits.
The cases now under consideration cannot be rationalized as the
cases considered under Class 1 have been, although in the nine-
teenth century many courts undertook to rationalize them that way. 3
To hold as these cases did, it would be necessary to take the position
that the rule of law involved gives the promisor a privilege and
power to take advantage thereof (which would make these cases
other illustrations of the type of cases considered under Class 6
below), but that it does not affect the right-duty relations of the
parties. To say that the rule of law bars the remedy but not the
primary right would not seem to be correct, because a primary legal
right without a remedial legal right is a legal solocism. A primary
right and a remedial right are merely the two hemispheres of one
right. But the correct position is that the rule of law does more
than simply give the promisor a privilege and power. It discharges
all legal obligation whether primary or remedial. This is proven
(a) by the fact that the precedent debt is not consideration for a
new collateral promise, either by the promisor;4 or by a third
person;5 (b) by the fact that if the promise is conditional, it can
be enforced only with the condition;16 (c) by the fact that in the
case of judgments,' specialties, 8 and tort liabilities,' there is no
liability on the old obligations, but if there is any liability, as a few
13 Carshore v. Huyck, 6 Barb. 583 (N. Y. 1849); Trask v. Weeks, 81 Me. 325,
17 Atl. 162 (1889); Way v. Sperry, 6 Cush. 238 (Mass. 1850); State Trust Co.
v. Sheldon, 68 Vt. 259, 35 Ati. 177 (1896); Gillingham v. Brown, 178 Mass. 417,
60 N. E. 122 (1901).
14 Earle v. Oliver, 2 Ex. 71 (1848).
15 13 C. J. 364, Note 53.
16 Barker v. Heath, 74 N. H. 270, 67 At. 222 (1907).
'
TNiblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174 (1879); Olson v. Dahl, 99 Minn. 433,
109 N. W. 1001 (1906).
18 Crawford v. Childress' Exec'r, 1 Ala. 482 (1840); Fuller v. Hancock, 1 Root
238 (Conn. 1791); Ludlow v. Van Camp, 7 N. J. L. 113 (1823). The American
Law Institute allows recovery on a new promise to pay an antecedent debt due
under a sealed obligation. Section 86, Restatement of the Law of Contracts.
19 Hegedus v. Thomas Iron Co., 94 N. J. L. 292, 110 Atl. 822 (1920).
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courts hold,2" it has to be on the new promise; (d) by the fact that
the Statute of Limitations, etc., cannot be waived ahead of time
without consideration, which means, of course, that thereby one
would be giving up a right ;21 (e) by the fact that the law will not
create a quasi-contract; (f) by the fact that a new promise or a
memorandum made after an action has been brought is insufficient ;22
(g) by the fact that in many other cases to be referred to hereafter
recovery is allowed on a new promise where there never was any
precedent debt; and (h) by the fact that to create liability after a
discharge in bankruptcy there must be a new promise-part pay-
ment23 or acknowledgment 4 is not enough--, and to create liability
after a discharge of the Statute of Limitations, there also must be
a new promise, though it is held it may be inferred from an ac-
knowledgment. 5
In the case of the Statute of Limitations, it has been a rule of
long continuance that so far as concerns land it is a statute of repose
and transfers the right of the former owner to the adverse claimant."
The same thing has been held for over fifty years with reference to
corporeal chattels." By analogy it would seem that it should be
held that after the running of the Statute of Limitations a debt is
also discharged and that the debtor has now become the owner of
his debt and the creditor has lost his right.8
In the case of a discharge in bankruptcy whether it is voluntary
20 Brooks v. Preston, 106 Md. 693, 68 Atl. 294 (1907); Otis v. Gazlin, 31 Me.
567 (1850); Belcher v. Tacoma Eastern Ry. Co., 99 Wash. 34, 168 Pac. 782 (1917).
21Warren v. Walker, 23 Me. 453 (1844).
22 Bateman v. Pinder, 3 Q. B. 574 (1842); Thornton v. Nichols, 119 Ga. 50,
45 S. E. 785 (1903); Bird v. Munroe, 66 Me. 337 (1877).
2 Tolle v. Smith, 98 Ky. 464, 33 S. W. 410 (1895).
24Crandall v. Mosten, 24 App. Div. (N. Y.) 547, 50 N. Y. Supp. 145 (1898).
25 Barnard v. Bartholomew, 22 Pick. 291 (Mass. 1839).
26Price v. Lyon, 14 Conn. 279 (1841) ; Percy Bordwell, "fDisseisin and Adverse
Possession," 33 Yale L. J. 1, 141, 285 (1924).
27 Chapin v. Freeland, 142 Mass. 383, 8 N. E. 128 (1886); Campbell v. Holt,
115 U. S. 620 (1885).
28 Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21 (1871) ; Pierce v. Seymour, 52 Wis. 272, 9 N. W.
71 (1881) ; Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 59 N. E. 1033 (1901) ;
Portugese-American Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7 (1916); 29 Yale L. J. 91;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 599. See also Yarlott v. Brown,
132 N. . 599 (Ind. 1921); reversed, 192 Ind. 648, 138 N. E. 17 (1923); 22 Col.
L. Rev. 451 (1922).
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or involuntary bankruptcy, the rule should be as strong as in the
case of the Statute of Limitations. There is still a moral obligation
to pay the old debt, but the legal obligation is entirely wiped out.
In the case of a composition of creditors the situation is a little
different from what it is in a discharge in bankruptcy. In a compo-
sition of creditors, both the moral obligation and the legal obligation
are discharged on the theory that the creditors have made a gift to
the debtor,29 unless the debtor reserves the moral obligation."
There is more doubt about the situation where a surety is dis-
charged by operation of law. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act has two inconsistent provisions on this subject. Section 89
seems to be based on the theory that the surety is discharged. Sec-
tion 109 seems to be based on the theory that he is simply given a
privilege.
To the cases already discussed should be added the case discussed
in Class 1 of a promise by a former infant after disaffirmance.
3
Where prior pecuniary benefits have been conferred on the
promisor but there is no precedent debt, the promisor is liable on
his subsequent promise, according to a strong minority viewpoint,
because of the moral obligation to pay for such benefits. Recovery
is allowed by these courts where there is no illegality,31 and where
there has been illegality if the th1ing illegal is malum prohibitum32
but not if it is malum in se.33
Enough illustrations of this class will be given to show what is
the fact situation. In Bentley v. Morse, a promisor obtained a judg-
ment by default and collected a debt after the debt had already
29 Warren v. Whitney, 24 Me. 561 (1845).
30 Straus v. Cunningham, 159 App. Div. 718, 144 N. Y. Supp. 1014 (1913).
31 Bentley v. Morse, 14 John. (N. Y. 1817) 468; Edson v. Poppe, 24 S. D.
466, 124 N. W. 441 (1910) ; Muir v. Kane, 55 Wash. 131, 104 Pac. 153 (1909) ;
Holland v. Martinson, 119 Ran. 43, 237 Pac. 902 (1925); Bagaeff v. Prokopik,
212 Mich. 265, 180 N. W. 427 (1920); Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206
Wis. 628, 238 N. W. 516 (1931); 16 Minn. L. Rev. 808. The rule seems to
include cases where one performs a duty for the promisor. 13 C. J. 364.
32 Usury: Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184 (1809); Early v. Mahon, 19 John.
147 (N. Y. 1821); Sunday: Campbell v. Young, 9 Bush. 240 (Ky. 1872); Cook
v. Porker, 193 Pa. St. 461, 44 Atl. 560 (1899); Brewster v. Banta, 66 N. J. L.
367, 49 Atl. 718 (1901); Statute of Frauds; Davis v. Moore, 13 Me. 424 (1836).
33Binnington v. Wallis, 4 Barn. & Ald. 650 (1821).
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been paid. In Mir v. Kansas, a party was the procuring cause of
a sale of property belonging to the promisor. In Edson v. Poppe,
the promisee conferred pecuniary benefits upon the land of the
promisor at the request of his tenant when the tenant had no
authority to make such request. In Early v. Mahon, the defendant
borrowed money from the plaintiff at usurious interest which made
the entire contract void, but the defendant later agreed to repay
the principal. In Brewster v. Banta, the defendant made a note on
Sunday for pecuniary benefits received when the Sunday law made
the note void, and he later made an express promise to pay the note.
In the usury and Sunday contract cases, illegality prevented there
being a precedent debt so that there was nothing left but the receipt
of pecuniary benefits. Where the common law held a former wife
liable on her promise to perform a promise made when she was such
wife though she had never received any pecuniary benefits, there
was no basis for liability other than the moral consideration involved
in the making of the promise, because at the common law there was
no precedent debt. In the case of Eastwood v. Kenyon, the plaintiff
conferred pecuniary benefits upon the estate of a young woman
who was a minor. After becoming of age she promised to pay for
these benefits and after her marriage her husband promised to pay
for them. The court correctly held that the husband was not liable
on his promise, because as to him there was neither a precedent debt
nor pecuniary benefits received; but it would seem that the wife,
except for the common law rule as to the contractual capacity of
married women, ought to be held liable on her original voidable con-
tract on the theory that she had waived her power of disaflirmance.
Where the Statute of Frauds makes a transaction void there is, of
course, no precedent debt, but wherever a promisor has received
pecuniary benefits, the courts would undoubtedly hold him liable
on the subsequent promise to pay therefor.
The moral obligation to pay for pecuniary benefits is so great
that it is remarkable that it is not the universal rule to enforce a
promise to pay therefor. It is probably the chief reason for the
liability in the precedent debt cases, only the courts forgot to put
the liability upon this ground. The fact that there is this moral
obligation is proven by the fact that the law will create a quasi con-
tract to pay for such pecuniary benefits where no promise is given."
3 4 King v. Brown, 2 Hill 485 (N. Y. 1842); Van Duesen v. Blum, 35 Mass.
229 (1836); Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859); White v. Franklin Bank,
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This liability is also required in order to give meaning to the usual
definition of consideration as benefit to the promisor or detriment
to the promisee. The only place where benefit to the promisor is
consideration is in the case of moral consideration. Under the
bargain theory and the theory of injurious reliance, it must be
detriment to the promisee. Hence, this definition which has been
repeated through the years seems to countenance the theory that the
conferring of pecuniary benefits upon the promisor should be
recognized as having operative effect to create liability and there-
fore it is a second kind of moral consideration.
Of course, where the pecuniary benefits have been conferred by a
gift, there never can arise any moral obligation to pay for them."
4
Where there has been past consideration but it has not conferred
pecuniary benefits on the promisor or been in the form of a precedent
debt, there is no moral obligation and no legal liability to pay there-
for, whether the situation has been legal or illegal."8 Detriment to
the promisee is not enough. 7 Such a situation raises no more moral
obligation than the mere making of a promise. Lord Mansfield
evidently thought that moral obligation alone was sufficient con-
sideration for a promise,' and some cases have followed Lord Mans-




Where the consideration, though given in the past, was given at
request, either with a later promise or without such later promise,
the one making the request or promise is liable in contract, but not
22 Pick. 181 (Mass. 1839); Duval v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156, 26 N. E. 343
(1891); liability in quasi contract alone is not enough because sometimes the
amount of recovery might differ and sometimes the law might refuse to create
a quasi contract even though benefits have been conferred.
35 Allen v. Bryson, 67 Iowa 591, 25 N. W. 820 (1885); Gooch v. Gooch, 70
W. Va. 38, 73 S. E. 56 (1911); Harper v. Davis, 115 Md. 349, 80 Atl. 1012 (1911).
36 Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & E. 438 (1840); Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick 207
(Mass. 1825).
3 7 Widger v. Baxter, 190 Mass. 130, 76 N. E. 509 (1906).
3 Hawkes v. Saunders, 1 Cowper 289 (1775).
9 Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36 (1813); Goulding v. Davidson, 26 N. Y.
604 (1863); Sharpless' Appeal, 140 Pa. St. 63, 21 Atl. 239 (1891).
40 13 0. J. 360, Note 10.
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on the theory of moral consideration, but on the bargain theory.
The courts had some difficulty at first in rationalizing this situation
and they therefore extended the action of general assumpsit rather
than the action of special assumpsit to it, but they finally rationalized
it as a situation where either the consideration continued down to
the time of the promise or the promise related back to the time of
the consideration." Today, of course, these cases would not be
rationalized by such fictions as these, but the law would infer a
promise from the request.42
6
Where antecedent privileges and powers rather than rights are
involved, nothing more than a promise or waiver is required. That
is, a person may give up or waive a privilege or power by a mere
statement to that effect just as he may create a privilege or a power
by a mere statement. Here is a field from which waiver has not
been driven, or "distributed." Illustrations of such privileges and
powers are found most frequently in the case of casual conditions
in contracts.4  But other illustrations of this are found in the
privilege and power of avoidance of voidable contracts4 4 and in the
privileges and powers created by offers. Where a right as dis-
tinguished from a privilege or power is involved, consideration is
required; that is, a person cannot give up or waive a right by a
mere statement to that effect." Hence, where a right is involved
there must be at least the moral consideration discussed in Classes
2 and 3 above.
The writer takes the position that the effect of the Statute of
Frauds is to prevent the making of a contract.46 As the result of
the operation of the Statute of Frauds, the defendant has the privi-
lege not to perform. If he has the privilege not to perform, the
plaintiff has no right to have him perform. A contract is an ante-
41 Sidenham & Worlington's Case, 2 Leo. 224 (1585); Riggs v. Buflingham,
Cro. Eliz. 715 (1600); Bosden v. Thinne, Yel. 40 (1603); Lampleigh v. Braith-
wait, Moo. K. B. 866 (1616).
4213 C. 3. 360, Note 17.
43 American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §88.
d
4 Seo n. 8 supra.
45 Foakes v. Beer, L. R. 9 A. C. 605 (1884); Ewart, Waiver Distributed.
40 Willis, " I The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism,' 3 Ind. L. J. 427,
532-36 (1928).
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cedent right in personam. It is a right-duty relation. If the plain-
tiff has no right, the defendant owes no duty. That means that the
Statute of Frauds prevents any contract. Therefore, there can be
no precedent debt. If pecuniary benefits have been conferred in
connection with the transaction, there is an illustration of the type
of cases discussed under Class 3 supra. But even if no pecuniary
benefits have been conferred and though there is no precedent debt,
the defendant may impose a liability on himself by signing a memo-
randum. How is this to be rationalized? The rationalization is
the same as that given immediately above; that is, that the law of
privileges and powers is outside of the law of consideration as well
as the law of agreement. There are many other privileges and
powers and immunities created by an oral agreement within the
Statute of Frauds. For example, suppose that the owner of real
estate makes two separate oral agreements to sell the same real
estate to different vendees. If he executes a conveyance to the
second vendee, the latter, though he has notice of the prior oral
agreement with the other vendee and though the vendor should
later execute a conveyance to such vendee, can retain his title,
because the vendor had the privilege not to perform his oral agree-
ment and he has transferred this to the second vendee. If, however,
the first oral agreement is validated by a memorandum prior to the
conveyance to the second vendee, the first vendee will be protected
against the second vendee with notice, because the vendor has
exercised his power and given the first vendee a right." This and
all of the other privileges, powers and immunities created by an
oral agreement within the Statute of Frauds are therefore only
further illustrations of the types of cases considered under this last
class of antecedent facts.
HuGH EVANDEPR Wnrs
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4 7 Piekerell v. Morss, 97 Ill. 220 (1880) ; Van Cloostere v. Logan, 149 InI. 588,
36 N. E. 946 (1894) ; Peck v. Williams, 113 Ind. 256, 15 N. E. 270 (1887).
